The common understanding is that we mistakenly attacked Iraq because we were traumatized by the horror of 9/11. We had to strike back somewhere and there was no more deserving dictator than Saddam Hussein. He was forever flexing his muscles, happily taking satisfaction in his barbaric treatment of those who he distrusted. Before using them in his war with Iran chemical weapons were unleashed upon 40 Kurdish villages as a test of their effectiveness. He had developed the longest artillery guns ever built, superior to anything the American military had. He had invaded Kuwait. Israel bombed his nuclear reactor which they assumed he intended to use. Israel was the regular recipient of missile attacks that plowed into their soil whenever Iraquis felt like sticking it to the Israelis. Hussein rewarded the families of Palestinian martyrs each time they killed Israeli citizens.
This man made us nervous for good reason. Madeline Albright and Al Gore and the Clintons tried to prepare us for an attack on Iraq, warning of their weapons of mass destruction. The CIA was certain they had them. Plans had been worked on long before 9/11. So, when Hussein jubilantly celebrated the 9/11 murder of thousands of Americans his fate was sealed. The anticipated destruction of Hussein could go forward.
So what was the mistake Biden keeps implying we made in a fit of rage. Okay there were no weapons of mass destruction. The media tried to pin it on Bush’s and Cheney’s lies. His supposed lying was clearly a fabrication. The decision to invade and overthrow Hussein was a mistake driven by the attack on us? I don’t think so. It had been planned long before. Trying to force democracy on people who were not ready for it–that spin? Perhaps a case could be made for that. But that desire had nothing to do with 9/11. It was a desire of the Neo-Conservatives, idealists who were enthused over the possibility that not only Iraq but Arab democracies could totally reshape the Middle East. The result was the Arab Spring, which brought great instabilities and very little democracy. But the idea of creating a democracy at least brings us closer to the huge mistake we made in Iraq. When we conquered Japan and Germany we punished their leaders, and many who worked loyally for them to murder innocents. But those running other government services were often left intact so that the society could function.
Hussein and his government were Sunni’s. The army was run by the Sunnis. A majority of Iraqis are Shiites. When we defeated Hussein in the first Iraqi war we verbally encouraged the Shiites to take control of the country. And then we backed off. Hussein slaughtered the Shiites and Kurds. The second time around, the decision was made to give the Shiites, the majority of Iraqis, power to run the country. That decision was not planned by President Bush’s advisors. It was made by Paul Bremer who headed the so-called Coalition Provisional Authority on May 11, 2003. Twelve days later, he issued an order wiping away the Iraqi military with a pledge to build a new one from scratch, untainted by any ties to Saddam’s regime. President Bush went along with Bremer’s decision not because it made the most sense but because he said he trusted someone who was actually in Iraq to make decisions. That was it. Many of Bush’s cabinet ministers, including Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice were completely surprised and unhappy with Bush’s mistake. But there was no way that it could be undone. Paul Bremer had not been in Iraq before he was put in charge of the country. A career diplomat he had been given a two week crash course in Middle Eastern politics before being sent there. Was he influenced by the Neoconservative idealism that cast the Shiites as the good guys and the minority Sunni’s as the oppressor?
While the U.S.ordered dissolution of the Iraqi army was a major error, it was compounded by former Shi’ite Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki’s wholesale firing of Sunni commanders in favor of more compliant, if less competent, Shi’ites during his 2006-2014 tenure. That turned what was supposed to have been a national army into little more than a sectarian militia that took orders from the Prime Minister’s inner circle. According to Jack Keane, a retired Army vice chief of staff and architect of the “surge” of 30,000 additional U.S. troops into Iraq in 2007 “Malaki went into that army and pulled out all of its distinguished leaders, whose guys were devoted to them, and put in these cronies and hacks.” And so began the Iraqi civil war. The former army became soldiers opposed to our allies in Iraq. They saw the government we favored, Shiite Iraq, as a puppet of Iran. Not until we refocused our assistance away from being anti-Sunni did that war come to an end.. We turned our attention to Iran dominated Shia militia. Our former Sunni enemies now joined us.
So what should we have learned from our mistakes in Iraq that can be applied after a Gaza victory? The United States withdrew from Japan in 1952. But even before Japan regained full sovereignty, the government had rehabilitated nearly 80,000 people who had been purged, many of whom returned to their former political and government positions. Here is the issue after Israel’s victory. They say they are going to completely eradicate Hamas. But some in Hamas had nothing to do with the slaughter of Israelis. They were as surprised by what the military wing of the party did as the Israelis. Many of them have been negotiating with Israel all along, and some of them may be not only competent but moderate. Just as the PLO had members who were not terrorists, and subsequently became partners in the West Bank, Hamas has people who should remain in power. They are Palestinians. I don’t know if they love Israelis but they are reasonable. Israel should not repeat America’s mistakes in Iraq. I am assuming that their justifiable rage will be tempered by their smarts. Pragmatism, realism should guide Israel rather than broad sweeping labeling.